Disciplinary diversity is being recognized today as the key to establish a vibrant academic environment with bigger potential for breakthroughs in research and technology. However, the interaction of several factors including policies, and behavioral attitudes put significant barriers on advancing interdisciplinarity. A "cognitive rigidity" may rise due to reactive academic lobbying favouring inbreeding. Here, we address, analyse and discuss a mathematical model of lobbying and interdisciplinarity dynamics in Academia. The model consists of four coupled non-linear Ordinary Differential Equations simulating the interaction between three types of academic individuals and a state reflecting the rate of knowledge advancement which is related to the level of disciplinary diversity. Our model predicts a rich nonlinear behaviour including multiplicity of states and sustained periodic oscillations resembling the everlasting struggle between the "new" and the "old". The effect of a control policy that inhibits lobbying is also studied. By appropriate adjustment of the model parameters we approximated the jump/phase transitions in breakthroughs in mathematical and molecular biological sciences resulted by the increased flow of Russian scientists in the USA after the dissolution of the Soviet Union starting in 1989, the launch of the Human Genome Project in 1992 and the Internet diffusion starting in 2000.
Introduction

1
The challenging complex problems that we are facing today, the ones with pressing 2 important social, health and environmental impacts (such as the climate change, the and efforts from diverse scientific disciplines. Thus, the role and importance of beneficial in terms of fast production of research results as it fosters research team 36 cohesion and continuity and diminishes risks recruitment [15] . However, the challenges 37 of today demand openness and disciplinary diversity to innovation [6, 7] . 38 Here, we address a mechanistic dynamical model in the form of coupled nonlinear 39 ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that aspires to simulate the interplay between 40 lobbying practices and disciplinary diversity at the level of a department.
41
Our model (see Figure 1 for a conceptual scheme) contains three different types of to this category have a genuine interest and tendency to work across traditional 55 disciplinary boundaries. In fact, this attitude has been explicitly recognized as a 56 transdisciplinary orientation characterizing researchers with higher production of 57 interdisciplinary research articles [2] . Thus, lobbyists put barriers and obstacles to the 58 careers of independent researchers by influencing the recruitment process in a biased 59 way to the advantage of their own growth. However, we are not stating that it is 60 intrinsically wrong to try to favour the own group, as this can be the natural case also 61 for an independent researcher. The main difference in our perspective relies in the Figure 1 . Conceptual overview of the model. Schematic representation of academic system structure and related effects on rates of breakthrough knowledge advancement. Black filled symbols refer to independent researchers in different fields, triangles and open circles represent lobby and neutral individuals, respectively. In (A) the system is characterized by high disciplinary diversity and small sized lobbies, thus maintaining sustainable conditions for positive rates of knowledge advancement and consequent strong stimulus to innovation. In (B) the system presents large sized lobbies and therefore low discipline diversity, producing a negative feedback on the rate of knowledge "jumps" and consequent reduced stimulus to breakthroughs. The transition from B to A is only possible by an external policy control against lobbying. Greek letters refer to model parameters see Table 1 level of hostility against the others. An independent researcher appreciates a good 63 active group, independently of its affiliation. Differently, a lobbyist perceives as a risk 64 the growth of a different group. These two opposite behaviours objectively produce 65 feedbacks on the diversity levels of the academic scenario with lobbyists and 66 independent researchers decreasing and increasing, respectively in the long term, the independent researcher. Such a decision is influenced in an analogy to the concept of 72 "cultural attractors" by two opposing factors: the "power" of lobbyists and the level of 73 attractiveness of interdisciplinarity, respectively [18, 19] .
74
We also address a fourth variable (the potential for breakthrough knowledge, BK), 75 representing the effect of the level of knowledge integration of disciplinary diversity.
76
By definition BK is enhanced by independent researchers and inhibited by lobbyists 77 because disruptive technologies and/or breakthrough concepts most likely rise from 78 cross-border interactions rather than from data accumulation within an established 79 field [6, 7] .
80
The model dynamics have been systematically studied with the aid of numerical 81 bifurcation theory to explore the solutions in the parametric space and detect the 82 critical points that mark the onset of phase changes in the academic structure and the 83 related capability of innovation. Within this context, the bifurcation diagrams were 84 constructed in the one and two dimensional parametric space with respect to the 85 external policy intensity aiming at establishing disciplinary diversity and the "power" 
Results
98
The system of ODEs Eq. (7-10) (See Materials and Methods) was analysed using the 99 tools of numerical bifurcation analysis. We analyzed the model dynamics with respect 100 to the intensity of the power of lobbyists to recruit neutrals (represented by the 101 parameter β) and the intensity of the external policy to tackle with lobbying 
104
In the absence of control policy, i.e. for κ = 0, and for β = 0.14, the system 
116
To systematically investigate the system's behaviour w.r.t.β, in the absence of a 117 control policy, we constructed the bifurcation diagrams shown in Figure 2E -H. branch, a transcritical bifurcation (T R) appears at which the lobby-free state looses 127 its stability in favour of another branch of stable equilibria that ends up to the turning 128 point T P 2 . This branch is now characterized by the co-existence of all three "species" 
138
To analyse the system's behaviour in the presence of control policy against 139 lobbying, i.e. for κ > 0, we constructed the bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ. staff, see Figure 3A ), moderate densities of lobbyists (around 19% of the total staff, 147 see Figure 3B ), low densities of I (around 1 % of the total staff, see Figure 3C ) and a 148 relatively low/moderate potential for breakthroughs (around -0.3,see Figure 3D ). At 
158
For β = 0.18, we get the bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ depicted in Figure 3E -H.
159
Now the subcritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation (AH) turns into a supercritical at 
173
Taken all together, the above two one-dimensional bifurcation diagrams suggest the 174 existence, in the two-dimensional parameter space (κ, β), of at least one Bautin 
179
To explore the overall system's behaviour in the two-dimensional parameter space 180 (κ,β), we constructed the two-dimensional bifurcation diagram depicted in Figure 5 .
181
We also illustrate phase portraits of a sustained oscillation within the region of (non zero) real eigenvalues becomes zero), yet these points are not bifurcations. Hence, 202 we don't show this branch in the two dimensional bifurcation diagram.
203
Discussion
204
As well known in biology and ecology, diversity is a key factor for selection processes, 205 system evolution [20] and ecosystem productivity [21] . The negative effects of excess 206 of inbreeding are well known, producing worsening of genetic diversity and 207 consequently lower competitive performance in the long term [22] . In analogy to this, 208 our model addresses a reciprocal negative feedback between the potential of knowledge 209 breakthroughs and the growth of lobbies due to the related effects on disciplinary 210 diversity.
211
An in-depth analysis of the Universities in USA [1] conception of familism/inbreeding can be described in which the "family" corresponds 224 to a scientific/cultural/behavioural category and the degree of kinship assessed by the 225 level of affiliation/similarity to the same category (lobby).
226
In Europe, several studies have revealed high levels of academic inbreeding, where 227 in some countries it reaches as much as 95% [17, 24] . On the other hand, the 228 importance of intellectual and scientific diversity has been recognized in American 229 universities, which in general do not hire their own PhD students. In USA, around
230
93% of candidates to academic positions were reported as externals [25, 26] .
231
In fact it has been reported that inbreeding inhibits the entrance of new and fresh 232 ideas as research partners within the same disciplines with strong ties over long 233 periods may "naturally" be entrapped to a clique [3] . Interestingly, it has been argued 234 that the production of quality outcomes may become limited not only by the 235 individuals deficiencies, but also "by cartels of mutually satisfied mediocrities" [27] .
236
Under such conditions, best individuals of small/weak groups are out competed by 237 mediocres of strong large tribes. On the other hand, loose ties in such scientific cliques 238 may provide opportunities/potential for integration of interdisciplinary knowledge 239 from outsiders and therefore breakthroughs [3] .
240
On the other hand, interdisciplinarity has been associated with research 241 breakthroughs [1] , but its quantitative and objective assessment is difficult [4] .
242
Disciplinary diversity is a necessary condition for the growth and establishment of 243 interdisciplinary research and can be inferred to some degree by ISI subject 244 categories [28] . However, disciplinary diversity is a necessary but not a sufficient 245 condition to guarantee knowledge integration leading to truly interdisciplinary 246 research; the latter rather depending on the successful interaction of "local bodies" of 247 knowledge [4] . 
306
It should be noted that the intensity of external action that is necessary to 307 moderate lobbying behaviour is relatively large with respect to the values of the other 308 rates. This reflects the fact that (as also reported in [7] ) in order to tackle 309 conservative attitudes, a high level of awareness and effort is required. For higher 310 values of the power of influence of lobbyists, the system behaviour is enriched with 311 stable sustained oscillations in a relatively small window of the parameter space.
312
These oscillations in the presence of a control action can be interpreted as steps back 313 and forth dynamics between openness and closeness to new ideas as known to occur in 314 societies with opposite tendency induced by concurrency [34] . 315 We should note that interdisciplinary knowledge does not imply superiority over 316 disciplinary knowledge, nor that disciplinary research drives necessarily to the creation 317 of lobbies. Advance of knowledge obviously occur in well established academic 318 disciplines, however, in order to avoid decline in such positive performances, the 319 research institutions need to be open to external development and recruitment [1, 35] .
320
In our opinion, interdisciplinarity should not be regarded as an end in itself, but as a reduction on the capability of knowledge advancement. On the other hand, high levels 325 of innovation are related to systems characterized by efficient interdisciplinary network 326 made probable by high levels of disciplinary diversity. Intermediate conditions can 327 create cycles of oscillatory performances, whereas poor quality can be changed only by 328 external interventions injecting individuals from different disciplines into the system, 329 thus destabilizing the natural lobby trends to increasing "cognitive" rigidity. The 330 entrance of fresh/novel ideas in a system most likely will produce jumps of scientific 331 innovation. Then, "good" science can be sustained by supporting research which is not 332 limited to established main streams. This can be achieved only by introducing 333 negative feedback on decision makers to force them away from academic inbreeding, 334 thus reinforcing disciplinary diversity.
335
Materials and Methods
336
A mean field model describing the dynamics of academic populations and related 337 scientific potential to breakthroughs is presented. Three different types of academic 338 staff individuals are identified and labeled as follows:
339
• L (Lobbyists which "defend" their own discipline and group, hindering the 340 entrance of new ideas and research and thus disciplinary diversity).
341
• I (Independent researchers, reflecting disciplinary diversity and thus potential 342 for advancing interdisciplinary research which may lead to breakthroughs).
343
• N (Neutrals who either enter into the Academia or they are already inside the 344 system and are "politically" passive in their preferences regarding the advance of 345 diversity/interdisciplinarity). 
where, θ is the rate of growth of BK per independent researcher, η is the rate of 353 decline of BK per lobbyist, and, ǫ is the fade out rate of BK in the absence of any
354
"stimulus".
355
The model dynamics evolve according to the following rules:
356
• Individuals leave the system (getting into pension or leaving the department)
357
with a rate µ.
358
• In an analogy to the infection rate in networked epidemic models [36, 37] , a 359 lobbyist may influence/"infect"/convince a neutral to become part of the lobby 360 through direct interaction/contact. This is modeled through the transmission 361 rate β ≡ p · s, where p is the per contact with a lobbyist probability that a 362 neutral will be convinced to join lobbyists, and s is the average number of 
• When BK is positive, reflecting a relative high level of interdisciplinarity, thus a 367 large potential for breakthroughs, the easier is for a neutral to become an 368 independent researcher, and the easier is to moderate/neutralize the behaviour 369 of a lobbyist.
370
More specifically, neutrals become independent researchers with a rate 
379
• When BK is negative, reflecting a relative low level of interdisciplinarity/ 380 potential for breakthroughs, the easier is for an independent researcher to be 381 neutralized.
382
More specifically, independent researchers leave the system/neutralize with a 
386
• At low levels of interdisciplinarity, as reflected by negative values of BK, we also 387 impose a "control policy" that exerts an external action/feedback aiming to 
Hence, κ · p ′ LN (BK) is the rate at which the external policy neutralizes lobbying. 393 Its inverse can be regarded as the mean latent period, i.e. the period between 394 the application of the policy and neutralization. [38, 39] .
404
In summary, based on the above assumptions, the mean field model reads:
Note that if the initial conditions are chosen so that N + L + I = 1, the above Newton-Raphson iterations were set equal to 1.E − 06. The tolerance of test functions 411 used to detect criticalities was set equal to 1.E − 05. The computations of limit cycles 412 was performed using 20 mesh points and 4 collocation points.
413
A summary of the model parameters and variables are shown in Table 1 . 
